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AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS: A FREE
EXERCISE PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
Parochial schools traditionally have formed an important
part of the educational structure in this country.' Nearly 11%
of all elementary and secondary school children attend private
sectarian schools.2 Tuition costs are increasing at a rapid
rate," and given the realities of today's inflationary economy,
increasing pressure for government tuition subsidies of paro-
chial schools comes as no surprise. In the United States Sen-
ate, a bill has been introduced which would provide tax cred-
its for the cost of private education.' In California, a growing
movement presses for a state constitutional amendment to es-
tablish a tuition voucher system which will aid private
schools.'
Many legislative attempts to provide direct financial aid
or tax credits for the cost of secular education in parochial
schools have been stricken by the United States Supreme
Court as violative of the first amendment establishment
clause.' But in the course of its deliberations, the Court has
paid little attention to the "other" first amendment religion
clause 7 free-exercise, which guarantees that the exercise of re-
0 1983 by Jeffrey H. Wong
1. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247 (1968).
2. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATIONAL
STATISTICS 49 (1981). See also NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, PRO-
JECTIONS OF EDUCATION STATISTICS TO 1988-89, at 19 (1978); NATIONAL CENTER FOR
EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN AmzRicAN EDUCATION VI (1981).
3. Association of Christian Schools International, Tuition and Salary Surveys
for 1979, 1981 shows an increase of nearly 32% in the median elementary school
tuition.
4. S. 550, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See Tuition Tax Relief Act of 1981:
Hearings on S. 550 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 44, at 22-23 (1981) (Statement of J.
Chapoton) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
. 5. An Initiative for Education by Choice reprinted in Coons, Making Schools
Public, in PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 103 (E. Gaffney ed. 1981).
6. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ... "
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise thereof
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ligion will remain free from government interference.
In light of the growing pressure for government funding,
it is appropriate to examine an argument based on the free
exercise clause which would compel direct government tuition
aid for sectarian school children when attendance at public
school is forbidden by their religious scruples.
The following hypothetical will help focus the issue dis-
cussed in this comment: Mr. Jones is the parent of two ele-
mentary-aged schoolchildren. As a homeowner, Jones pays his
share of property taxes which are used to support local public
schools. The Jones children are entitled to free education in a
nearby public elementary school. The Joneses sincerely be-
lieve that their religion requires a strict separation from all°
"worldly" contacts. In their eyes, this belief prohibits, among
other things, attendance at public schools. Thus, the Joneses
feel compelled to send their children to the private school op-
erated by their church, despite the obvious financial burden.
Mr. Jones reasons that education is a public welfare bene-
fit8 in which his children would partake but for their religious
belief. On the one hand, the Jones' religion forces the forfei-
ture of the economic benefit of free education, and on the
other hand, acceptance of free education forces Mr. Jones to
disobey his religion. In short, the state coerces him into choos-
ing between "God and mammon."
This comment presents the argument that under the free
exercise clause a state must provide some form of tuition as-
sistance to parochial school children, like the Jones', whose re-
ligious beliefs prohibit their attendance at public school. Part
I of the comment explores the tension inherent in the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the two religion
clauses, and traces the development of each clause. Part II of-
fers a solution to the tension based on the interpretive trends
signaled in recent Court decisions. Finally, the comment re-
turns to Mr. Jones' predicament, analyzes an argument based
on the free exercise clause and posits a Court response.
...." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
8. As used in this comment, the term "welfare benefit" refers to any govern-
ment-funded program which benefits the public at large. This definition would en-
compass providing not only a food stamp program, but also public streets, police ser-
vices, fire protection, and public education.
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II. TENSION AMIDST THE RELIGION CLAUSES
The two religion clauses present a dilemma: On the one
hand, the free exercise clause prohibits state action which
"burdens" religious practice; on the other hand, the primary
effect of allowing free exercise is the "'advance' [of] religion
by facilitating the exercise of religious belief,"9 an act in direct
violation of the establishment clause. While this seemingly in-
herent tension between the two clauses has been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court 0 and commentators,"
some experts blame it on the Court's dualistic interpretation
of the religion clause which views each clause as a mandate
separate from the other.'2 Consequently, to better understand
the tension, it is necessary to trace the separate evolutionary
paths of each clause.
A. The Shrinking Establishment "Wall"
Consideration of state aid to sectarian schools tradition-
ally has centered on the first amendment establishment
clause, which presents a substantial barrier to parochial school
tuition aid.
The Supreme Court first examined the effects of the es-
tablishment clause on education in Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation's by considering the constitutionality of providing
state-funded transportation to parochial school children. It
concluded that such aid was constitutionally permissible,
stating:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
9. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 726(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10. See, e.g., id. at 719.
11. See L. TamE, AMERICAN CONSTI T ONAL LAw §§ 14-2, 14-3 (1978); Choper,
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 673 (1980); Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach
of the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REv. 167, 169-73(1963). Griswold labels the approach "Fundamental" and comments: "Under the
Fundamental approach, the judge puts on blinders. He looks at one phrase only; he
blinds himself to everything else." 8 UTA L. Rxv. at 173. See also Pfeiffer, Freedom
and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First Amendment, 64 MINN.
L. REv. 561, 567-69 (1980).
12. See Pfeiffer, supra note 11, at 567-69.
13. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or pre-
fer one religion over another. . . . No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious ac-
tivities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice reli-
gion . . . . In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a
wall of separation between Church and State.""
The transportation program in Everson was constitu-
tional because it did no more than provide a general program
which assisted parents in getting their children to school. Like
other public services, such as fire and police protection, the
transportation program was "separate . . . and indisputably
marked off from the religious function."' 5
Following Everson, the Court considered several aid
cases,' and refined the elements constituting impermissible
establishment. In Board of Education v. Allen,17 the Court
upheld a New York state law which required local public
school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all stu-
dents in grades seven through twelve, including students in
private schools. The Court, quoting Everson, stated, "to with-
stand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must
be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .
The statute in Allen had the requisite secular purpose by
furthering the "educational opportunities available to the
young" 9-a purpose expressed on the face of the statute.
While recognizing that sectarian schools provide religious
training, an admittedly sectarian function, the Court nonethe-
less found a valid secular purpose in the secular educational
component of the parochial school program. The Court re-
jected the argument that the secular and religious components
14. Id. at 15-16.
15. Id. at 18.
16. Because this comment deals with direct tuition aid to parochial school chil-
dren, it will not discuss in detail cases which deal with other types of aid. See, e.g.,
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (state
reimbursement for costs incurred in administering state-mandated tests constitu-
tional); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (some state aid programs constitu-
tional); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (state provision of instructional mater-
ials unconstitutional).
17. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
18. Id. at 243.
19. Id.
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were so intertwined that the secular textbooks were in fact
instrumental in teaching religion.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, o the Court added a third prong
to the establishment test. Lemon summed up the test: "First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; . . . [and] finally, the statute must not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.""
Under the third prong, the Court invalidated statutes which
provided direct state payments to reimburse religious schools
for the salaries of teachers teaching secular subjects.
Despite the Lemon decision, which evidenced a predilec-
tion against aid to parochial schools, several states continued
their attempts to provide tuition aid to sectarian schools
through various tax credit and tuition reimbursement
schemes.2 In Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist 5 the Court evaluated the constitutionality
of both a tuition reimbursement and tax credit plan.2 4 Apply-
ing the Lemon test, the Court held that the second prong pro-
vided sufficient basis for the rejection of the tuition reim-
bursement plan because the plan's implementation would
permissibly advance religion. Although framed as a reim-
bursement to parents, not the schools, the Court found the
effect of the statute was to relieve parents' "financial burdens
sufficiently to assure that they continue to have the option to
send their children to religious-oriented schools, 2 5 thereby
providing financial support for private sectarian schools. The
tax credit plan was rejected for similar reasons. 2e
Thus, although Nyquist again recognized that sectarian
schools perform secular as well as religious functions and that
20. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
21. Id. at 612-13.
22. Other programs including free textbooks and instructional material have
sometimes been approved and sometimes been rejected. See supra note 16. Commen-
tators and courts have been unable to reconcile these cases with any general principal
of law. E.g., California Teachers Ass'n v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 808 n.12, 632 P.2d 953,
961 n.12, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300, 308 n.12 (1981) and accompanying text.
23. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
24. The Court also considered and rejected a program providing direct money
grants to sectarian schools for maintenance purposes. Id.
25. Id. at 783. While the Court did not consider the third prong, it did acknowl-
edge that a secular purpose was illustrated by the "recitation of legislative purposes
appended . . ." to the statute. Id. at 780.
26. Id. at 790-91.
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"some forms of aid may be channeled to the secular without
providing direct aid to the sectarian . . . , " the Court none-
theless stated that "the channel is a narrow one.' 7 Nyquist
makes it clear that the direct tuition aid program contem-
plated in this comment faces a considerable barrier in the
form of the establishment clause "wall."
The "wall," however, may not be as impregnable as it ap-
pears at first blush. In light of recent Court decisions, several
commentators have questioned the continuing vitality of the
Lemon test. Since the resolution of the religion clause ten-
sions depends on the relative strength of each clause, it is ap-
propriate to consider the current vitality of the three-pronged
establishment test developed in Lemon.
The first prong, that a state action must have a "secular
purpose," has never been a substantial barrier in considering
the permissibility of aid to parochial schools. The Court has
consistently echoed its position that it will not scrutinize
closely a stated secular purpose when a proposal aids the pro-
cess of education. 8
Although the third prong, which forbids "excessive entan-
glement" had been used to invalidate direct aid programs,"
the recent decision in Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Regans0 has raised questions regarding its
continued vitality. Regan involved a legislative scheme to re-
imburse private schools for the cost of administering state-
mandated tests. To qualify for state funds, the school was re-
quired to keep accurate accounting records of test-related ex-
penses, submitting these records to the state. The Court held
that there was no entanglement when records which involve
no more than normal accounting procedures are made availa-
ble to the state."1 The holding seemed to represent a distinct
turnabout with respect to the entanglement provision, causing
one observer to comment that the entanglement test "like the
easily satisfied secular purpose requirement, [has become] a
27. Id. at 775.
28. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 7; see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying
text; see also supra note 25.
29. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615-24.
30. 444 U.S. 646 (1980). See also California Teacher's Ass'n v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d
at 802 n.5, 652 P.2d at 957 n.5, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 304 n.5. See Note, Plurality Deci-
sions and Judicial Decision-making, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1127, 1128-29 (1981).
31. Id. at 659-60.
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largely perfunctory inquiry.""2
Of the three Lemon tests, the second allowing aid only if
its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion ap-
pears to have continuing vitality.3 Yet, as discussed below, "
the "effects" test also appears to be most in conflict with the
free exercise standard which prohibits any state action which
effectively, albeit indirectly, burdens the free exercise of one's
religion. In short, if the recent Court retreat 5 from the entan-
glement test is indicative, the Justices are shying away from a
strict application of the Lemon test.3 6
The erosion of Lemon may also belie a deeper trend by
the Court to contract the overall effectiveness of the establish-
ment clause. The existence of this trend is further supported
by the recent decision in Valley Forge Christian College v.
32. Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Establishment Clause-
Direct Public Aid to Secular Educational Function of Parochial Schools, 48 TENN. L.
REV. 127, 140 (1980). See also Comment, Cessation of the Excessive Entanglement
Test and the Establishment of Religion, 7 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 975 (1980); Note, Con-
stitutional Law-First Amendment-State Aid to Nonpublic Sectarian Colleges, 44
TENN. L. REV. 377, 387 n.61 (1977). See also Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. at 666 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. at 780-84. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
35. In Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983), decided after the preparation of
this comment, the Court gave further evidence of its retreat from Lemon. At issue
was the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute permitting tax deduction of certain
expenses incurred by parents in providing elementary and secondary education to
their children. Upholding this statute, the Court applied the tripartite Lemon case
consistently with the trends outlined in this comment. The Court had little problem
finding that the statute had a secular purpose, noting that "governmental assistance
programs have consistently survived . . . [the secular purpose] inquiry . . ." Id. at
3066. The Court also had "no difficulty in concluding that the Minnesota statute...
[did] not 'excessively entangle' the state in religion." Id. at 3071. As anticipated, the
"more difficult . . . question . . . [was] whether the Minnesota statute has the 'pri-
mary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of the non-public schools.'" Id. at 3067.
Despite a vigorous dissent, the majority nevertheless resolved this element in favor of
the statute's constitutionality by narrowly construing Nyquist and other prior cases.
36. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 857 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as NOWAK]. According to testimony received at hearings on Tuition
Tax Reliefs:
[The Lemon test] is referred to . . . as the starting point of constitu-
tional analysis. In fact, it is a very questionable starting point, because
its location keeps shifting. The test has changed over the years. . . . It
is anyone's guess where the justices will come out next time. One sus-
pects it depends on how they want the decision to come out.
Hearings, supra note 4, at 248 (Testimony of A. Scalia).
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Americans United for Separation of Church and State7
which made it more difficult for a private group to get stand-
ing to raise the establishment clause issue.38 Although framed
by the majority as a holding which concerns only the constitu-
tional requirements for standing to litigate, the dissenters
pointed direct attention to the decision's limiting effect on the
establishment clause. Justice Stevens noted that "the Court
holds, in effect, that the Judiciary has no greater role in en-
forcing the Establishment Clause than in enforcing other
'norm[s] of conduct which the federal government is bound to
honor . . .' ."9 Justice Brennan's dissent, which decries the
majority's opinion, is more direct. "Plainly hostile to the
Framer's understanding of the Establishment Clause ...
[tihe Court . . . 'slam[s] the Courthouse door against plain-
tiffs who [as the Framer's intended] are entitled to full con-
sideration of their [Establishment Clause] claims ....
Moreover, because most establishment cases have been
brought by private groups,"1 this ruling will undoubtedly re-
sult in fewer establishment challenges which will further re-
duce the effectiveness of the clause.
B. The Free Exercise Clause: Expanding the Coverage
The free exercise clause, unlike the establishment clause,
has mainly developed outside the educational context. In the
earliest Court interpretations of the clause, a distinction was
drawn between the government's power to regulate belief and
its ability to regulate the practice of the belief.L42 Congress
37. 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982).
38. In Valley Forge the Court held that respondent's mere claim of an estab-
lishment clause violation in the absence of "any personal injury suffered by. . . [re-
spondent] as a consequence of alleged constitutional error; other than the psychologi-
cal consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees" was insufficient to confer standing under U.S. Constitution, Art. III. Id. at
765.
39. Id. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 780 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159,
178 (1970)).
41. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982) (respondents); Committee for Pub. Educ.
and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (appellants); Committee for Pub.
Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (appellants); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (respondents); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (respondents); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (appellants).
42. NOwAK, supra note 36, at 872.
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"was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but
was left free to reach action which were in violation of social
duties or subversive of good order . . .," without regard to
religious implications.
As one traces the evolution of free exercise protection, it
becomes apparent that the legislative freedom to regulate reli-
gious practice was not without limits, despite the Court's ear-
lier pronouncement. Rather, the Court slowly, but discernibly,
moved to limit government intrusion into religious prac-
tices-a move which effectively expanded the scope of free ex-
ercise protection.
The Court has expanded the scope of free exercise along
two paths: (1) The definition of "religion" for free exercise
purposes has been broadened, and (2) the Court has forbidden
not only direct governmental prohibitions of religious prac-
tices, but also indirect burdens which result from the with-
holding of a general public welfare benefit.
1. Path One: What is Religion?
Protection under the religion clauses is afforded to the
claimant whose belief of practice is, in fact, "religious." Some
practices are considered religious on their face such as prayer
and bible-reading." Others are derived from the nature of the
religion, e.g., Saturday worship is a bona-fide religious prac-
tice of a Sabbatarian. 45 However, many beliefs conform with
few, if any, of the traditional indicia of religion.4 The bur-
geoning pluralism in American religion has forced the Court
43. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
44. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (school
bible-reading unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayer
violates establishment clause).
45. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). A "Sabbatarian" is one who recog-
nizes Saturday as the religious day of worship.
46. According to Professor Tribe, "'[Religion' [traditionally] referred to theis-
tic notions respecting divinity, morality, and worship, and was recognized as legiti-
mate and protected only insofar as it was generally accepted as 'civilized' by Western
standards." L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at § 14-6. Another commentator has noted that
religion has three fundamental attributes: "[it] influences human behavior; its adher-
ents believe that its principles are authoritative; and the source of that authority is
perceived to transcend both individual conscience and the state .. . . These three
attributes describe commonly recognized, God-believing, organized religions, but can
extend as well to creeds that are nontheistic or noninstitutional." Note, Religious
Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90
YALE L.J. 350, 363-64 (1980).
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to transgress "the closely bounded limits of theism to account
for the multiplying forms of recognizably legitimate religious
exercise. '47 However, religion must have some definitional
boundaries, lest "every individual with sufficient zeal would
have the prerogative to decide which laws would be binding
on him."4 8
The Court, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,'9 drew a distinction
between matters philosophical and personal in nature and
those stemming from religious scruples.50 Moreover, a reli-
gious belief must be central or basic to the beliefs of a group.5
This requirement of "group-centrality" is distinguished from
"individual-centrality" in which religious truth is determined
with reference to the individual's scruples. For example, in
Yoder, the group centrality standard was satisfied after an ex-
tended discussion of Amish culture showed that the Amish
way of life was "one of deep religious conviction, shared by an
organized group." 5' Thus, the Court held that Yoder must be
exempted from compliance with state compulsory school at-
tendance statutes because as a member of the Amish religious
community, his religion forbade enrollment of his children.
A California line of cases provides the best example of the
judiciary's use of the centrality standard. In the landmark
case, People v. Woody,53 the California Supreme Court held
that the use of peyote, an hallucinogenic drug, in a religious
ceremony by Native Americans was exempted from state
criminal sanctions prohibiting the use of controlled sub-
stances. Decisive was the fact that peyote was the sine qua
47. L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at § 14-16.
48. Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966
Wis. L. REv. 217, 271.
49. 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
50. Id. at 216. In the "Conscientious Objector" cases, for example, the Court
refused to restrict "religion" to theistic beliefs. See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,
495 n.11 (1961) (such non-theistic beliefs include "Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Cul-
ture [and] Secular Humanism. . . ."). Rather, the definition of religion was broad-
ened to encompass a number of unorthodox and unconventional beliefs. See Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). In
effect, these two decisions allow an individual to exempt himself from military service
upon a showing that he subscribed individually to a belief in some amorphous ulti-
mate "power" or "being," a belief which need not bear close resemblance to that
which has been traditionally considered a "religion." See supra note 45.
51. See generally L. TRm, supra note 11, at § 14-11; Galanter, supra note 48,
at 274-78.
52. 406 U.S. at 216.
53. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1969).
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non of defendants' religion without which they could not
practice and to "forbid the use of peyote is to remove the the-
ological heart of Peyoteism.""' Subsequent cases with facts
similar to Woody have rejected the free exercise arguments
because the defendants could not show that their own beliefs
met the high standard of group-centrality."
The high burden which had been placed upon potential
free exercise claimants by the group-centrality standard may
not survive the recent decision, Thomas v. Review Board of
Indiana Employment Security Division." Thomas, a Jeho-
vah's Witness, was denied unemployment benefits because his
religion forbade his participation in the manufacture of tanks.
Unlike Yoder or Woody, where the centrality of the religious
practice was unquestioned, Thomas' beliefs were neither com-
monly-held, nor part of the central, basic or cardinal tenet of
the Jehovah's Witnesses.
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court accepted
without question Thomas' claim that the scruple in question
was "religious" in nature. The Court went further and re-
moved from judicial determination the question of whether or
not a belief was "religious." Rather, the judiciary is limited to
questions of the sincerity and honesty with which a belief is
held.' 8 This position, if logically applied, would dramatically
change free exercise law by rendering the group-centrality
standard impotent." Instead of using the standards of the
claimant's organized religion to define what is basic or cardi-
nal for free exercise purposes, the Court's focus may now rest
upon the beliefs of the claimant himself. If the individual
holds a precept basic, the Court will not contradict him, un-
less the claim is "so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motiva-
tion as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exer-
54. Id. at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
55. People v. Mullins, 50 Cal. App. 3d 61, 123 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1975) (defendant
claimed he was growing marijuana for use in religious ceremonies); People v. Werber,
19 Cal. App. 3d 598, 97 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1971) (defendant argued marijuana allowed
him to reach a religious state of mind); People v. Collins, 273 Cal. App. 2d 486, 78
Cal. Rptr. 151 (1969) (defendant claimed marijuana aided him in communication
with the Supreme Being).
56. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
57. Id. at 711.
58. Id. at 715-16.
59. See Note, Religious Belief Protected Under Free Exercise Clause Though
Not Shown to be Derived from Cardinal Tenets of Common Faith, 22 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 235 (1982).
1983]
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cise Clause." '
When viewing the change that has occured from Yoder
and Woody to Thomas, is seems apparent that the Court has
expanded free exercise protection in a manner consistent with
the growing religious pluralism.
2. Path Two: What Burdens Religion?
The second path taken by the Court in broadening free
exercise protection concerns the type of governmental action
which is forbidden by the free exercise clause. Just as there
are some beliefs which do not fall within the scope of free ex-
ercise, there are also government actions which are not
banned by the free exercise clause. "[T]he [First] Amendment
embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to
act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the sec-
ond cannot be.""' The Court has faced this freedom to act
several times and has displayed, in each instance, the ten-
dency to expand free exercise protection.
In Reynolds v. United States," one of the original free
exercise cases, the Court deferred to Congress' regulation of
religious action so long as no belief was formally prohibited."
Since Reynolds, the Court has increasingly limited the broad
legislative freedom to regulate religious practice. First, the
Court rejected licensing statutes which regulated door-to-door
distribution of circulars64 and solicitation of funds." These
cases established the proposition that the government may
not directly prohibit a religious practice if some less restric-
tive means of achieving a significant secular goal was
available."
The next major step was taken in Sherbert v. Verner. In
Sherbert the Court "went beyond the earlier cases by ex-
tending free exercise protection to the government's withhold-
ing of an economic benefit as opposed to the government's im-
60. 450 U.S. at 715-16.
61. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
62. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
63. NOWAK, supra note 36, at 872-73.
64. Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, (1939).
65. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940).
66. See L. Tam, supra note 11, at § 14-10.
67. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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position of a direct ... burden."8
Appellant Sherbert was a Sabbatarian whose employment
was terminated upon her refusal to work on Saturdays. A sub-
sequent application for unemployment benefits was denied.
She filed suit alleging that the denial violated her free exercise
rights. The Court applied a two prong test: (1) Was there an
infringement of claimant's constitutional rights of free exer-
cise, and (2) was the resulting burden justified by a compel-
ling state interest? 69 Under this test the Court held that the
state's withholding of a financial benefit-to which Mrs. Sher-
bert would be entitled but for some behavior mandated by her
religion-violated the free exercise clause by placing an indi-
rect economic burden upon her. The majority concluded:
The ruling forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion
in order to accept work on the other hand. Governmental
imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against appellant for her Sunday worship.70
The justifications proffered by the state, that the possible
filing of fraudulent claims might "not only dilute the unem-
ployment compensation fund but also hinder the scheduling
by employers" were rejected by the Court as insufficiently
compelling absent factual substantiation far greater than that
which the state offered.71
It is plain that the protection extended by the Court to
indirectly burdened religious practices represents another
broad expansion of free exercise. While there are rarely out-
right prohibitions upon religious practice, indirect burdens
which make the practice difficult or expansive are common.72
Furthermore, the continuing vitality of the Sherbert test can-
not be doubted, as it was the standard used in Yoder and
Thomas.
The two paths taken in expanding the scope of free exer-
cise have certainly brought the Court far from its early pro-
nouncement that religious practices could be freely regulated.
68. See L. TRiE, supra note 11, at § 14-10.
69. 374 U.S. at 403.
70. Id. at 404.
71. Id. at 407.
72. See Note, supra note 58.
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Moreover, the most recent decisions such as Thomas evidence
a continuing trend to broaden free exercise protection.7"
III. THE RELIGION CLAUSES: TENSION RESOLVED
As noted at the outset of this comment, the existence of
the tension between the two religion clauses has been recog-
nized by both commentators 7 and the Court. When faced
with the task of determining which clause is superior in dis-
posing of a conflict situation, it appears that the commenta-
tors generally have "allocate[d] superiority to free exercise
,,75
Although the Court does recognize the tension, it has
never expressly decided which of the two clauses must yield.
However, the current broadening of free exercise protection
and contracting of establishment clause barriers support the
supposition that free exercise is "dominant in any conflict
with the anti-establishment principle. 7 6 In Yoder, the major-
ity indicated a preference for the free exercise clause:
The court must not ignore the danger that an exception
from a general obligation of citizenship on religious
grounds may run afoul of the Establishment Clause, but
that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exemption
no matter how vital it may be to the protection of values
promoted by the right of free exercise. 77
Chief Justice Burger agrees, commenting that
73. In another decision, the Court has continued to expand religious liberty. See
Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981) (state college must allow religious groups
use of campus facilities under "open forum" policy).
74. Professors Tribe and Choper have proposed models to reconcile the two re-
ligion clauses. Under Tribe's proposal, "governmental actions arguably (even if not
beyond doubt) compelled by the free exercise clause," would not be forbidden by the
establishment clause. L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at § 14-4. Applying this model to the
cases, Tribe concluded that "the free exercise principle should be dominant in any
conflict with anti-establishment principle." Id. at § 14-7.
Choper's proposal is phrased in terms which would limit the effect of the estab-
lishment clause. Under his proposal, "the Establishment Clause should forbid only
government action whose purpose is solely religious and that is likely to impair reli-
gious freedom by coercing, compromising or influencing religious beliefs. Choper,
supra note 11, at 675. While Choper does not agree free exercise should "automati-
cally" dominate in cases of conflict, his proposal to limit the effect of the establish-
ment clause in effect promotes the free exercise of religious liberty. Id. at 686.
75. Pfeiffer, supra note 11, at 569.
76. L. TamE, supra note 11, at § 14-7.
77. 406 U.S. at 220-21.
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[tihe essence . . . is that government aid to individuals
generally stands on an entirely different footing from di-
rect aid to religious institutions . . . . [Alt least where
the state law is genuinely directed at enhancing a recog-
nized freedom of individuals, even one involving both sec-
ular and religious consequences, . . . the Establishment
Clause no longer has prohibitive effect.78
In sum, the Court appears to be elevating the right of the in-
dividual to freely exercise his religious beliefs over the state's
interest in avoiding an establishment violation.
IV. MR. JONES AND MANDATORY AID
Against the background of tension and resolution dis-
cussed above, a solution to Mr. Jones' predicament may be
outlined. One might recall that Mr. Jones appeared caught be-
tween the horns of a "God v. mammon" dilemma: By follow-
ing his religious scruples, he impales himself on the horn of
economic deprivation. Conversely, by availing himself of the
opportunity for free public education, he bares himself to Di-
vine condemnation. To avoid impalement on either of the
equally unappealing "horns," Mr. Jones makes the following
argument based on the free exercise clause.
Mr. Jones' specific argument is based on Sherbert which
prohibits the government from forcing a choice between "God
and mammon." Application of Sherbert requires that three
questions be asked: (1) Is his claim based on a "religious" be-
lief, (2) Does the government refusal to provide tuition aid
burden his practice of religion; and (3) Is the government able
to justify its refusal?
The Supreme Court's disposition to expand the scope of
free exercise protection has been previously addressed. While
Jones' claim that his religion forbade his children's attend-
ance at public schools probably would not have passed muster
under the "group-centrality" standard-which judged a "reli-
gious" claim against the tenets and precepts held by the reli-
gious group as a whole-under the "individual-centrality"
standard, as evidenced in Thomas, the claim is viable. The
Court has recognized that religiously-motivated separation
from the "world" may affect educational institutions.79 While
78. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 801-02 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
79. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205; Everson, 330 U.S. at 22-23 (Jackson, J.,
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there is disagreement as to the precise contours of the re-
quired separation, the need for group consensus, after
Thomas, is now irrelevant.80
Since Mr. Jones' claim is "religious," attention shifts to
the second question, "Does the government refusal to provide
tuition aid burden Jones' practice of religion?"
Under Sherbert, the government may not withhold a ben-
efit to which a person would otherwise be entitled but for
some behavior mandated by his religion. The withholding was
prohibited by the free exercise clause because the financial
burden imposed by the state had the effect of coercing the
individual to choose either fidelity to his religion or submis-
sion to the realities of a his pocketbook.
It has long been recognized that the essential function of
a state includes providing public education."1 However, the
benefit of free education is withheld from Mr. Jones because
his religion forbids attendance at the public school. As a re-
sult, Mr. Jones must bear alone the substantial financial bur-
den of educating his children.
The financial cost placed on Mr. Jones is heavy. Just like
Mrs. Sherbert, Jones is economically pressured to choose be-
tween the state financial benefit and his religion. And, like
Mrs. Sherbert, this economic pressure indirectly burdens
Jones' religious scruples and is prohibited by free exercise.
The state must "carve an exception" 8' out of its practice of
providing education only in public schools and provide fund-
ing for the Jones' children at their sectarian school.88 Any ac-
tion short of such aid will continue to impermissibly burden
Mr. Jones' religious freedom.
The use of Sherbert in the tuition aid context is not novel
to this comment. In short, several lower courts have rejected
attempts to apply the Sherbert test in support of the proposi-
dissenting).
S0. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
S1. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213.
82. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 420 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
83. On its face Sherbert requires only that the state provide an exemption to its
general rules, merely exempting the Jones children from having to attend public
schools, Cf., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), does not relieve the financial
burden which stems from the private school tuition. At the heart of Sherbert is the
"God-mammon" choice which the state cannot by any means force an individual to
make. Relief from the coercive economic pressure of bearing the tuition costs alone
comes only with a state subsidy of tuition.
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tion that free-exercise compels parochial school aid.84 The de-
cision in Brusca v. Missouri5 is typical.
Appellant in Brusca, made a Sherbert free exercise argu-
ment for mandatory funding similar to the one proposed by
Mr. Jones. The court, however, ruled Sherbert inapposite be-
cause the plaintiffs did not allege that attendance at public
schools was forbidden by a "basic tenet or precept of their
religion." 6 Because the other cases rejecting the Sherbert ar-
gument similarly do not involve basic tenets, the argument
presented by Mr. Jones-that state aid is compelled when a
basic tenet of religion forbids public school attendance-has
not been accorded full judicial consideration.
Further consideration of the Brusca opinion aids in un-
derstanding why those appellants did not succeed in their
Sherbert argument. Sherbert is premised on state action
which economically coerces a person to violate his beliefs. In
Brusca, there was no such coercion because no basic religious
teaching forbade public school attendance. The state, by sup-
porting only public schools, did not in any way coerce one to
compromise his religion.8 7 The long-recognized right of a par-
ent to choose a non-public, religious school for his children88
did not mandate that the state must fund such an institu-
tion.89 It was merely a right to choose, to exercise voluntary
discretion. Although the Court has recognized that "a state
law interfering with a parent's right to have his child educated
in a sectarian school would run afoul of the free exercise
clause," 90 no such prohibition existed in Brusca.
The key to understanding this logic is the assumption
that attendance at a sectarian school is the result of a volun-
tary choice. 1 Although the state's failure to provide financial
84. Jackson v. California, 460 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1972); Luetkemeyer v. Kauf-
mann, 364 F. Supp. 376 (W. D. Mo. 1973); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.
Ohio 1972); Hickman v. Wujick, 333 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
85. 332 F. Supp. 275, 279 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1050 (1972).
86. Id.
87. See Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376, 386-87 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
88. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
89. Brusca, 332 F. Supp. at 277.
90. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at
788.
91. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), is the foundational case.
There, the Court expressed only a right to choose a religious school. Appellants in
Brusca argued that the Pierce right-to-choose required state provision of opportuni-
ties to exercise that choice. The Court has clearly rejected the requirement that the
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assistance was undoubtedly a factor to be considered by an
individual in the exercise of choice, the basic right to freely
exercise that choice on religious grounds was not infringed.
The choice between attending a public or parochial school was
not a matter controlled by the basic precepts or tenets of a
religion." The basic tenets of few, if any, religions either pro-
hibited public school attendance or required adherents to at-
tend church-run schools.
Unlike Brusca, this comment contemplates a situation in
which a basic tenet of religion is at stake-namely, the sepa-
ration of a believer from the world.
The final question to be considered is whether the state
can justify this burden.
It is clear that the traditional establishment clause inter-
pretation bars the tuition aid sought by Mr. Jones. However,
it is also clear that Mr. Jones' predicament sits squarely at the
point of tension: free exercise demanding aid and establish-
ment forbidding the very same aid.
A solution to this tension has already been proposed. The
current trends, contracting the effect of establishment and ex-
panding the scope of free exercise, balance in favor of free ex-
ercise. Applied to Mr. Jones' predicament, this situation com-
pels the state to grant Mr. Jones tuition aid for his parochial
school children.
V. CONCLUSION
The rising cost of parochial schooling is creating pressure
for government tuition aid. Although the establishment clause
traditionally has forbidden such aid, the free exercise clause
may, under Sherbert, require that aid be given to an individ-
ual whose religion forbids attendance at public schools. Under
this argument, the two religion clauses are in direct conflict:
free exercise demanding the very aid that establishment
forbids.
The viability of the free exercise argument turns upon
resolving the tension that exists under the Court's dualistic
interpretations of the two religion clauses. Based on interpre-
state must provide opportunity for the exercise of voluntary choice. See Committee
for Pub. Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783.
92. But see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. at 22-23 (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(citation of Catholic canon law mandating attendance at Catholic schools.)
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tive trends evident in recent Court decision, the free exercise
clause seems to predominate in all conflicts with the establish-
ment clause. Thus, under the terms of the argument pro-
posed, government tuition aid must be provided.
Jeffrey H. Wong

